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SEXUAL CONFUSION: ATrORNEY-CLIENT SEX
AND THE NEED FOR A CLEAR ETHICAL RULE
ANTHONY E. DAVIS*
JUDITH GRIMALDI**

An area of professional responsibility which has come
under particular scrutiny in recent months is that of sexual
involvement between lawyers and their clients during the
course of the professional relationship. Despite the ramifications of such conduct, neither the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules) nor the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) contain any direct reference to the appropriateness or otherwise of sexual relations between the attorney and
client; neither expressly prohibits nor directly regulates such
conduct.
Some argue that the absence of a specific rule is appropriate.' Some existing general provisions of the Code and Rules
have been determined to regulate such conduct indirectly: particularly the provisions concerning the attorney's fiduciary duty
to his or her clients, the requirements of integrity and competence, and the rules governing conflicts of interest. Opponents
of a rule suggest that a specific rule on attorney-client sexual
relations is therefore unnecessary, would amount to excessive
*
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1. Interview with David Bell, Senior Staff Attorney, Office of
Professional Competence, Planning and Development, State Bar of California
(Mar. 1, 1992). Mr. Bell reported that this was a widespread view among the

responses received from attorneys to the circulation of CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 3-120, regarding sexual relations
with clients.
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regulation and would involve unacceptable interference with
attorneys' private lives.
Advocates for a specific ethical rule regulating sexual conduct between attorney and client believe that sexual involvement in the course of professional representation damages the
attorney's objectivity, unacceptably interferes with the professional relationship, undermines the integrity of the legal profession as a whole, and most importantly, is likely to violate the
client's trust and call into question the lawyer's ability to fulfill
his or her obligations as a fiduciary.' The authors firmly
belong to this group, and will demonstrate in this article why
they believe that the time has come for the adoption of clear
and specific regulation of sexual relations between attorneys
and their clients.
The unequal balance of power between the attorney and
client, which is intrinsic to the relationship because of the attorney's special skill and knowledge on the one hand, and the client's vulnerability on the other is at the core of this issue. This
inequality creates the potential for the attorney to dominate the
client and to take unfair advantage. When this power to dominate is used to initiate a sexual relationship, actual harm to the
client and to the client's interests will almost inevitably result.
This kind of overreaching by an attorney is harmful in any legal
representation, but is most dangerous when a client is seeking
legal assistance during a time of personal crisis such as divorce,
after the death of a loved one, or when facing criminal charges.
The trust inherent in the role of lawyer creates the expectation
that whatever confidences the client has vouchsafed to the lawyer will be solely used to advance the client's interest, and will
not be used to the attorney's advantage, sexual or otherwise.
Within this fiduciary framework, the initiation of sexual behavior is always wrong, no matter who is the initiator, and no matter how willing the participants say they are. The parallels in
the therapeutic professions discussed below, clearly indicate
that apparent consent is in fact not true, volitional, or
uncoerced consent. In this area, called the "forbidden zone"
by psychiatrist Peter Rutter, the factors of power, trust and
dependency remove the possibility of the client freely con2. The extent of the sexual exploitation of clients by attorneys is
perceived by many to be a growing problem. A proposal for a rule change in
Illinois by Illinois State Senator Adeline Geo-Karis was motivated by at least
50 cases alleging sexual harassment by attorneys which were brought to her
attention which she details in her press release on the subject. She advocates
a specific rule which would prohibit sexual involvement between lawyers and
their clients during the continuation of the professional relationship.
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senting to sexual contact, because the lawyer has the greater
power. Therefore, the responsibility is on the lawyer to guard
this "forbidden boundary." 3
This article will demonstrate the present need for a specific
ethical rule, where none has previously existed, and will suggest the form which such a rule should take. In addressing
these issues, this article will review the standards used by other
professions in regulating its members' sexual relations with
their clients. This article will explore the application of
existing, non-specific regulations now used in these situations
within the legal profession by analyzing malpractice case law,
disciplinary cases, and ethics opinions. The proposed ethical
rules being debated in California, Oregon and Illinois will be
reviewed and discussed. Finally, the authors will propose their
own model rule to regulate sexual relations between attorneys
and their clients.
I.

THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS STRICTLY PROHIBIT SEXUAL

INVOLVEMENT WITH PATIENTS

A.

The Mental Health Professions

In response to incidents of psychotherapist-patient sexual
relations, mental health professional organizations have universally condemned sexual activity in therapeutic relationships
as exploitative. 4 The American Psychiatric Association
expressly states in its code of ethics that ". . . sexual contact
with a patient is unethical." 5 The American Psychological
Association's rules of ethics mirror the other health professions
in noting that "sexual intimacies with clients are unethical." 6
The National Association of Social Workers has adopted a code
which states that "The social worker should under no circumstances engage in sexual activities with clients." 7 The medical
profession as a whole needs to look no further than its ancient
Hippocratic Oath to find a clear prohibition of sexual relations
with patients. The oath states: "In every house where I come I
will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far
3.

PETER RUTTER, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE 28 (1989).

4.

Linda M. Jorgenson et al., The Furor over Psychotherapist-PatientSexual

Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L.

REV. 645 (1991).
5. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
WITH ANNOTATIONS APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 2, at 1 (1986).
6. AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N,
ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES
OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS § 6(a) (1991).
7.
NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS § II(F)(5)

(1980).
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from all intentional ill-doing and seduction, and especially
from the pleasures of love with men and women
"8....
8
The medical and mental health professions thus specifically and unequivocally prohibit sexual contact with clients or
patients. Notwithstanding this clear prohibition, sexual
involvement with patients is a leading cause of malpractice
claims against psychotherapists.'
Individual states have
addressed this abuse through the imposition of criminal sanctions, civil liability and licensing requirements.' 0
The mental health professions have documented evidence
in surveys and studies that sexual exploitation of clients causes
damage to the therapeutic relationship and to the client
directly." Therapists report that abused patients have difficulty continuing their therapy, and may sometimes need hospi12
talization and even become suicidal.
Psychotherapy is rendered ineffective when sexual contact
is incorporated into the professional relationship. The patient
has sought out therapy to bring about a life change. The therapist's role is to maintain reality and solidify the boundaries of
appropriate behavioral responses to life's decisions. Engaging
in sexual relations with a patient flies in the face of the goals of
therapy, by breaching the important boundaries being created,
and by eliminating essential objectivity. For these reasons, the
mental health professions adhere to such explicit codes of professional ethics in the area of sexual relations between patients
and therapists.
B.

The Medical Profession Generally

The American Medical Association (AMA) condemns sex
relations between patients and physicians. 3 The report of the
AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs states that any
relationship in which a physician takes or risks taking advantage
8.
9.
SEXUAL

STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

579 (3d ed. 1972).

See Irwin Perr, Medicolegal Aspects of Professional Sexual Exploitation, in
EXPLOITATION

IN PROFESSIONAL

RELATIONSHIPS,

211, 212 (Glen

Gabbard ed. 1989).
10. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 70, para. 802 (1990) (providing a
statutory cause of action for sexual exploitation of patients by
psychotherapists).
11. Nanette Gartrell, M.D. et al., Reporting Practices of Psychiatrists Who
Knew of Sexual Misconduct by Colleagues, 57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 287, 292-

93 (1987).
12. Jorgenson et al., supra note 4, at 662.
13. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Op. 8.14 Sexual
Misconduct (1989). This article covers the laws of six states which prohibit
sexual contact between physicians and patients as it jeopardizes patient care.
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of a patient's emotional or psychological vulnerability is unethical.' 4 The Council further advises that "before initiating a dating, romantic or sexual relationship with a patient, a physician's
minimum duty would be to terminate his or her professional
relationship with the patient."' 5 In addition, the report
extends the caution further to a physician's former patients
stating, "[I]t would be advisable.., to seek consultation with a
colleague before initiating a relationship with the former
patient." Restriction of sexual contact with former patients is
rooted in the potential for unethical behavior resulting from
the special trust, knowledge and influence the physician derives
from the former professional relationship. The intensity and
emotional nature of the physician-patient relationship makes it
difficult for the romantic relationship not to be affected by the
professional relationship.' 6
A relationship between patient and physician may include
considerable trust, intimacy or emotional dependence.' 7
The length of the former professional relationship, the
extent to which the patient has confided personal or private information to the physician, the nature of the
patient's medical problem, and the degree of emotional
dependence that the patient has on the physician all may
contribute to the intimacy of the relationship. i1
Finally, the general knowledge that the physician acquires
about the patient's past, the patient's family situation, and the
patient's emotional state all may render the sexual or romantic
relationship with a patient or former patient unethical since the
physician does not reciprocate in kind with similar information.
These factors together combine to create an imbalance in their
relationship, and this imbalance can breed sexual exploitation.
To summarize, the medical professions find sexual relations with patients unethical for the following reasons:
1. The physician's medical judgment, is obscured,
thereby jeopardizing the patient's diagnosis and
treatment.
2. The physician's gratification inappropriately interferes with the professional relationship.
14. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in the
Practiceof Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741 (1991) [hereinafter Sexual Misconduct].
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 2743.
18. Id.
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3.

The patient's trust - that the physician will work
only for the patient's welfare - is violated.' 9
The medical profession considers patient-physician romantic
and sexual conduct so potentially harmful that it expressly
warns against even non-sexual touching if it may be misinterpreted or lead to sexual contact.
Five states have taken the ethical sanction against patientphysician sexual conduct to another level, by passing criminal
statutes to control such conduct. Colorado, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have defined sexual
contact or assault under the guise of medical treatment as
rape.2 0 For example, New Hampshire makes it a felony to
engage in "sexual penetration with another person '[wihen the
actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the
victim in a manner or for purposes which are not medically recognized as ethical or acceptable.' -121 The stakes for physicians
sexually involved with their patients in these states are high.
These criminal statutes reflect the almost universal agreement
among researchers that the impact of this conduct on the
patient experience is negative.2
The members of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs have found the need to control physician-patient
sexual conduct paramount. They advocate education on ethical issues involving sexual misconduct throughout all levels of
medical training. The AMA also encourages the reporting of
sexual misconduct by a colleague. Four states have made this
reporting mandatory.23
II.

A

COMPARISON OF THE POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING THE
MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS

Having reviewed the rationale for the existence of the
express rule which exists in the health professions we can now
19. Id.
20. SeeJorgenson et al., supra note 4, at 668. The relevant statutes are:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-403(h)-404(g)(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:2(VII) (1986); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-2(D) (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 62-303(a)(vii) (1988).
21. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(VII) quoted in Jorgenson et al., supra
note 4, at 668.
22. David Karp & Judy Huerta, Professional Therapy Never Includes Sex, 7
CALIF. PHYSICIAN 42 (1990).
23. Sexual Misconduct, supra note 14 (quoting Kathryn C. Bemmen, M.D.
& Jean Goodwin, M.D., New Laws About Sexual Misconduct by Therapists:
Knowledge and Attitude Among Wisconsin Psychiatrists,Wisc. MED.J., May 1989, at
11).
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turn to consider whether the same rationale exists for an
equivalent rule for relationships between attorney and client.
The parallel, surely, is the fiduciary relationship with their clients/patients which both professions share. This relationship
arises from the professional's special expertise, and the confidence which the client/patient places in the professional. 2 4 By
virtue of the client's/patient's needs, this relationship is not
one of equals. Every professional bears full responsibility for
his or her actions since the client is dependent. The essence of
the fiduciary relationship is that the parties do not deal on
equal terms;2 5 the fiduciary may not overreach, take advantage
of, or abuse the client in any way.
Thus, the example of the medical profession has lessons
for the legal profession. The attorney, no less than the physi26
cian, from the outset exists in a fiduciary relationship with his
client. The client shares highly personal and intimate information with the attorney in the expectation that the attorney will
take care of the issue at hand. The client places herself in the
"hands of the attorney" expecting her interests to be protected. 27 The client may be ignorant of the legal system. The
attorney becomes the sole representative in solving the problem; this necessarily creates an unequal balance of power and
dependency, no less in many instances than in the doctorpatient relationship. This is especially accentuated when the
client's problem is emotional as well as legal. The lawyer in
this situation is as much a counselor as an advocate, and is
often seen as a therapist-like figure, even more closely mirroring the relationship of the physician and patient. Professor
John Elson, of Northwestern University School of Law, notes
that attorneys attempt to justify their sexual relationships with
their clients when their client/sexual partners are not at any
economic or psychological disadvantage.
He states,
"[c]ommon sense and scholarly authority, however, make clear
that this is rarely the case, at least in the divorce context. 28
24.

See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App.

1983).
25. See id.; see also Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Fiduciary
Theory Applied to PersonalDealings: Attorney-Client Sexual Contact, 45 ARK. L. REV.

459 (1992).
26. For convenience, and because most of the reported cases involve
male attorneys and female clients, this article adopts the convention of
referring to attorneys in the masculine and clients in the feminine genders,
and pronouns are used accordingly.
27. Andrew S. Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 8 (1965).
28. Letter from John Elson, Professor, Northwestern University School
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The counselor role carries the responsibility to avoid the
harm which a sexual relationship could cause. Case studies of
sexual exploitation of patients by psychotherapists found that
ninety percent of the patients were adversely affected.2 9 With
the harm so clearly documented in the medical profession,
there is reason to suppose that a parallel breach in the trusting
relationship between an attorney and client is no less harmful.
Surely, the client who places her trust in the attorney is as susceptible to harm as the patient who trusts her doctor.
The legal profession can learn from the clear boundaries
which are set by the medical/psychotherapeutic professions in
the area of sexual relations with clients. The prohibition in
those professions is based, as we have seen, on a firm belief
that sexual relations with patients cause harm. Lawyers must
recognize that the burden is squarely on the legal profession to
demonstrate why its clients are less likely to experience similar
damage from such conduct than that which has been clearly
shown to be experienced by doctors' patients thus abused.
Suggesting that the different nature of the help sought in some
way outweighs the identity of trust reposed in the two professions, or the identity of harm caused by any breach of that
trust, simply is not credible.
III.

COURTS HAVE HITHERTO NOT PROVIDED A LEGAL
REMEDY TO CLIENTS FOR AN ATTORNEY'S SEXUAL
OVERREACHING

To date, the courts have generally held that there is no
legal remedy for sexual exploitation of a client by an attorney
unless there has been harm to the legal representation, or the
attorney has made the legal representation contingent on sexual submission. In BarbaraA. v. John G.," the court considered
whether sexual relations with a client constitutes a compensable breach of the fiduciary duty."' In this case, the attorney
brought the suit against his client for collection of legal fees.
He was met with a cross-claim by his client for damages she
suffered from an ectopic pregnancy as a result of their sexual
contact. The attorney had misrepresented his ability to cause
her to become pregnant. In assigning and analyzing the attorof Law to California State Bar (Nov. 27, 1991) (commenting on proposed
rule of professional conduct regarding attorney-client sexual relations).
29. Jacqueline Bouhoutros et al., Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists
and Patients, PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC., Feb./Dec. 1983, at 191.
30. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).

31.

Id.
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ney's liability, the court held that the finding of a fiduciary relationship was a question of fact for the jury, except when the
fiduciary duty has been legally recognized. The court was cautious in finding fiduciary responsibility as a matter of law
because of the "unique facts of this case."'3 2 The court recognized that an attorney's relationship with a client is divided into
two spheres, "social" and "legal" and determined that a jury
would be better able to assess whether the attorney - because
of the legal relationship - was dominant, or whether the parties functioned on a more or less equal basis in their personal
relationship. 3 The lawyer has the burden of proving that the
sexual involvement was consensual. The lawyer would also
have to show that the client's reliance on his sterility statement
was unreasonable. By leaving open the possibility of the jury
finding a breach of the fiduciary duty as a result of the attorney's personal dealings with the client, the court intended to
create the possibility of liability for coercive conduct without
completely chilling all personal relationships. 34 Although the
court reversed the judgment against the client and ordered a
new trial, the court refused to hold that an attorney necessarily
breaches his fiduciary duty when he induces a client to have
sexual relations during the course of representation. The California court instead directed this question to the California
State Bar for resolution.3 5 As a result, a rule of professional
responsibility regulating attorney-client sexual relations was
adopted by California which is discussed later in this article.
Illinois faced a similar challenge in the malpractice case of
Suppressed v. Suppressed.3 6 The court in that case followed the
lead of BarbaraA. v. John G. by refusing to hold that an attorney
has a fiduciary duty in all his relations with the client, and
directed the issue to the Illinois legislature. In this case, the
client was seeking to recover for allegedly being harmed by
sexual contact with her attorney. Although the emotional harm
to the client was clearly demonstrated, no remedy was forthcoming in Illinois. The plaintiff, Jeanne Metzger, had hired an
attorney to represent her in a divorce case in 1983. She stated
in her testimony to the Illinois Senate Judiciary Committee, on
May 1, 1991, that,
32.

Id. at 432.

33.

Id.

34. Id. at 432-33.
35. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
is now before the California Supreme Court.
36. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill.
App. 1990).

CONDUCT

Proposed Rule 3-120
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Over a period of six weeks, he coerced me into having sex with him on three different occasions ....

People

frequently ask me: How could I let my lawyer do it? Why
did I agree to have sex with him? .

.

. Anyone who has

been through a divorce knows that at best it is a stressful
and difficult experience ....

As my marriage deterio-

rated, I began to feel very much out of control of my life.
The prospect of divorce was frightening to me. The
happy life I had led seemed about to end. With all these
fearful, confused feelings, my lawyer became my support
and my only hope.
I was devastated when my lawyer coerced me into
having sex with him, not once but three times. I felt confused, helpless and humiliated, and degraded. Worse
yet, I felt powerless to stop it from happening again. I
felt that if I did not comply with his demands, he
wouldn't represent me well. I was terrified to say no to
him.
I also felt trapped. I had given my attorney a $2,500
retainer, and I was afraid I wouldn't be able to get it back.
Finally, I found another attorney to represent me and finished up the divorce proceedings.
For a long time, I just wanted to forget the whole
degrading experience, but I felt that many other women
were probably also being sexually abused by their3 law7
yers, so I finally decided I had to take some action.
Ms. Metzger did take action, in the form of a complaint to
the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The Commission dismissed the complaint, finding that it
pitted the attorney's word against hers.38 The matter did not
end there for Ms. Metzger; she filed a civil suit. The defendant
attorney petitioned the court to suppress the names of the parties, and the court obliged. Thus, her case became known as
Suppressed v. Suppressed. She claimed that this suppression was
not to protect her identity but to protect the lawyer's identity.
In the interim, Ms. Metzger has revealed her identity as the
plaintiff in Suppressed in order to promote the passage of the
proposed new ethical rule in Illinois.3 9 Ms. Metzger's civil case
was dismissed as well; the judge ruled pre-trial that a lawyer
does not have any special duty not to take sexual advantage of
37. Direct Testimony of E. Jeanne Metzger to Illinois Senate Judiciary
Committee on Illinois Senate Bill 824 on May 1, 1991.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
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his client.4" Ms. Metzger's appeal was also denied by the appellate court which stated that the plaintiff's claim failed because
she failed to show that the defendant had breached his fiduciary
duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship. The court
reasoned:
Initially we note that if we were to accept plaintiff's contention that defendant in this case breached a fiduciary
duty arising from the attorney-client relationship, we
would be creating a new species of legal malpractice
action and we would necessarily be holding that inherent
in every attorney-client contract there is a duty to refrain
from intimate personal relationships. The plaintiff can
cite no support4 for this proposition, nor do we believe
that any exists. '
The court affirmed the concept that an attorney owes a
fiduciary responsibility to his client arising out of the legal relationship with the client. However, the court refused to hold
that the high standard of care required of a fiduciary should
extend to an attorney's personal relationships with his client.
The court held that proof that the attorney actually made his
professional services contingent upon the sexual involvement,
or that his legal representation of the client was, in fact,
adversely affected, needs to be established before such conduct
will be considered to be in breach of the attorney's fiduciary
duty.4 2
The Illinois court thereby declined to provide the client
with a remedy in this case, and instead charged the legislature
with the task of creating a new rule of professional conduct or a
statutory cause of action to address the propriety of sexual rela40. Id.
41. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 104-05.
42. Id. at 105. Justice Murray in the Suppressed opinion had compared
an attorney's fiduciary responsibility to the duty of psychotherapist to a
patient. In Illinois, it is considered malpractice for a psychotherapist to be
sexually involved with his or her patient during the course of treatment in
acknowledgement of the phenomenon of transference which occurs in the
therapeutic relationship. Transference creates a strong emotional bond
between the patient and therapist in which emotional material is displaced on
to the therapist in order to work out emotional barriers. Misusing the trust
which develops in this process by the therapist to secure sexual favors can be
psychologically damaging. The judge did not attribute this same high
standard to the attorney as the therapist, since he stated that the
responsibilities of a therapist versus an attorney are rooted in different goals.
The psychotherapist, he stated, is to engage in activity to improve the
patient's mental and emotional well-being, whereas the attorney has a duty to
only provide competent legal representation. Id. at 105 & n.2.

68

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

tions between an attorney and his client during legal representation. This case demonstrated that neither the existing rules
of professional conduct, nor the basic principles of fiduciary
duty are clear enough to prohibit this conduct, or to provide a
remedy to the aggrieved client. The Illinois court viewed the
sexual conduct as a personal choice which did not impact on
legal representation.
IV.

REGULATION OF ATtORNEY-CLIENT SEX IN
THE CODE AND RULES

Some states have successfully applied the Model Rules and
the Model Code to obtain sanctions in attorney disciplinary
cases involving attorney-client sexual involvement. These disciplinary proceedings have assigned fault to attorneys who
become sexually involved with their clients.4 3 Attorneys have
been reprimanded, otherwise sanctioned, and even disbarred
when found to have breached their fiduciary duty by putting
their clients' legal representation at risk. However, the outcome of these disciplinary cases is unpredictable since, in the
absence of specific rules, state disciplinary tribunals enjoy wide
discretion.
Neither the Code nor the Rules deal explicitly with the
issue of sexual relations with clients. However, several general
provisions have been used to address the issue of attorney-client sexual conduct when complaints have arisen or opinions
have been requested. The preamble of the Code sets the tone
for attorneys' conduct by stating:
Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the
touchstone against minimum standards. But in the last
analysis it is the desire for respect and confidence of the
members of his profession and of the society which he
serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for
the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate
sanction."
Thus the attorney is encouraged to uphold and maintain his
own integrity and that of the legal profession. The Code
requires attorney self-regulation and assumes that each attor43. See Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa
1979); In re Howard, 681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984); In re Gibson, 369 N.W.2d 695
(Wisc. 1985).
44. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
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ney will conduct him self with the utmost propriety. The Rules
also state:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although
other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique in this respect
because of the close relationship between the profession
and the process of government and law enforcement ....
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it
special responsibilit[y] . . .to assure that its regulations

are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the
bar.... Neglect of these responsibilities compromise the
independence of the profession and the public interest
which it serves. 4 5
V.

APPLICATION OF EXISTING, GENERALIZED RULES IN
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE CASES TO MISCONDUCT
INVOLVING SEX WITH CLIENTS

The high moral standards set out in the preambles to the
Code and Rules are rendered more concrete in Canon One of
the Code, which is intended to encapsulate the basic tenets of
the Code and to set forth the Code's fundamental moral standards. Ethical Consideration (EC) 1-2 states, "The public
should be protected from those who are not qualified to be a
lawyer by reason of deficiency in education or moral standards."4 6 In addition, EC 1-5 advises attorneys to "maintain
high standards of professional conduct" and to "refrain from
all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct." Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 1-101 mandates the maintenance of the integrity and
competence of the legal profession. More specifically, DR 1102 in addressing misconduct states,
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
45.
46.

Id.
MODEL CODE,

supra note 44, EC 1-2.

70

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

(6) Engage in any other conduct that4 7 adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Disciplinary Rule 1-102 focuses on the lawyer's need to
observe strictly his fiduciary responsibility to the client and to
demonstrate a high sense of honor. However, the meaning or limits - of "moral turpitude," as used in DR 1-102(A)(3),
have not been clearly defined by the courts.4 8 In spite of the
vagueness of terms, sexual conduct between the attorney and
client, especially when the attorney has sought sexual favors in
lieu of legal fees, has been designated by the courts as conduct
involving moral turpitude, such as in In re Howard.4 9
Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (3) has also been applied in disciplining attorneys for sexual conduct which also constituted
criminal behavior. Examples include In re Hicks,5 ° in which an
attorney was disbarred for sexual relations with a mentally
retarded woman resulting in pregnancy; 5 FloridaBar v. Hefty, 5 2
where an attorney's sexual misconduct with his minor step47. Id. DR 1-102.
48. The annotations provided to the disciplinary rules note:
Perhaps the best general definition of the term 'moral turpitude' is
that it imparts an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties
which one person owes to another or to society in general, which is
contrary to the usual, accepted and customary rule of right and duty
which a person should follow.
49. 681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984). In this case, the defendant attorney
engaged in sexual conduct with his client in exchange for legal services. His
conviction of the crime of prostitution resulted in a public reprimand. The
attorney was denied the request that a stipulation be added to his public
reprimand stating he was seeking counseling. The Disciplinary Board
advised leniency because the misconduct was only a single act with a
prostitute. The court disagreed with the board, stating that the reason for
misconduct is irrelevant, since the law specifically provides that a conviction
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude is conclusive evidence.
50. 20 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1933).
51. Id. This 1933 case held that the attorney can be disbarred for
"willful, flagrant or shameless acts" and "conduct unbecoming a lawyer" in
making a mentally retarded unmarried female dwarf of 28 years old pregnant.
The Oklahoma rules for disbarment are as quoted in this case:
(1) That he has ceased to possess that good moral character
prerequisite to admission to the practice of law.
(2) That he is guilty of the commission of an act, though
disassociated from his duties to the court or to his clients which
renders him an unfit, unsafe, and untrustworthy person to be
entrusted with the powers, duties and responsibilities of an
attorney and counselor at law, even though the commission of
such an act not be punishable as a crime.
Id. at 896.
52. 213 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1968).
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daughter was held to justify disbarment; and In re Kimmel,5"
where conviction of a felony involving sexual misconduct with a
minor was held to warrant suspension from practice during the
period of probation for the offense. Attorneys have been
found to be unfit to practice law and disbarred as a result of
their sexual involvement with clients when the acts are highly
sensational or involve criminal conduct. In Matter of Wood,5 4 an
attorney reduced his legal fees in return for sexual favors from
his client, induced his client to pose for pornographic pictures,
and was disbarred. In general, the Code has formed the basis
for finding an attorney unfit to practice law when he commits
acts of moral turpitude even if these acts fall outside the role of
lawyer or officer of the court.
Sections (A)(4), (A)(5), and (A)(6) of DR 1-102 have been
indirectly applied to sexual contacts with clients, forming the
basis for findings of misconduct when the sexual relations with
a client involved misrepresentation, or were prejudicial to the
client and to the administration ofjustice. In In re McDow, 55 an
attorney's sexual relations with his client during the client's
divorce proceeding resulted in the husband being granted a
divorce based on the wife's adultery with her attorney. The
courts have sanctioned attorneys involved in divorce cases
when their sexual involvement harmed the client's legal position. In Lehr v. Lehr,5 6 the attorney's sexual involvement with
53. 322 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1982).
54. 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986). The attorney was charged with
engaging in acts of moral turpitude in violation of DR 1-102 (A)(3), with
engaging on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation
of DR 1-102(A)(5), and with engaging in conduct which adversely reflected
on his fitness to practice law in violations of DR 1-102(A)(6). In this case the
attorney reduced his legal fees in exchange for sexual favors and posing for
pornographic photos. One of clients involved was under eighteen. The
court found that the attorney "exploited his client's plight for his personal
and sexual gratification." 489 N.E.2d at 1191. In addition, the court found
his lack of professionalism an embarrassment and a breach of the confidence
his client placed in him when they relied on his legal skills. Id. at 1189.
55. 354 S.E.2d 383 (S.C. 1987). The attorney was disciplined for
engaging in an adulterous relationship with a client during the course of a
divorce action which directly resulted in the husband being granted a divorce
on the grounds of his wife's adultery. The court held that this conduct had an
adverse impact on his client's financial settlement in the divorce. This was
considered professional misconduct because it was:
(1) damaging or prejudicing the client during her representation
(2) engaging in conduct which created the appearance of
impropriety
(3) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
Id. at 384.
56. 583 P.2d 1157 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). In this divorce proceeding, the
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the client prejudiced his client's case and legal position. The
court responded negatively to the wife's child custody petition
because there was evidence that she was sexually involved with
her attorney.
Despite all of these decisions in cases where harm, or
direct breach of the professional obligations has been established, sexual relations between attorneys and their clients have
never been found to be, per se, acts of "moral turpitude," or
otherwise automatically in violation of the Canon One group of
interdictions. The Rules also address misconduct in Rule 8.4,
specifically prohibiting conduct involving: dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. This last category, misrepresentation, has been applied to incidents of sexual relations with
clients when the sexual contact involved or was induced by dishonesty and/or misrepresentation. Specific references to
moral turpitude found in the Code have been omitted from the
Rules. Instead, the Rules focus on illegal conduct reflecting
adversely on the attorney's fitness to practice law. 5 7 Thus,
under the Rules, sexual involvement between attorney and client is clearly barred only if the activity is the result of fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation or illegal acts.
VI.

APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN DISCIPLINARY CASES
INVOLVING SEX WITH CLIENTS

A central theme in many disciplinary cases involving sexual
involvement of attorneys and clients is conflict of interest.
Canon 5 of the Code, dealing with conflicts of interest, has
wife was not awarded custody of her three-year-old child, although she was
the primary caretaker, because the trial judge was incensed because the man
she moved in with was her lawyer and her employer.
57. The Rules provide:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on the fitness to
practice law ....

However, some kinds of offenses carry no such

implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of
offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no
specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a
lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer
should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate a
lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4 cmt. (1992) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. This comment suggests that whom an attorney chooses to
have sexual relations with is immaterial unless it affects the ability to practice
law. There is no presumption of impropriety inherent in the sexual involvement with clients in this Model Rule.
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been applied to attorneys' conduct which overreaches the
interests of their clients. Canon 5 states, "A lawyer should
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."' 58 Ethical Consideration 5-1 states, "The professional
judgement of a lawyer should be exercised within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interest, nor the interests of other clients.
. . should be permitted to
59
dilute his loyalty to his client."
Rule 1.8 parallels EC 5-1 in addressing conflicts of interest. It states that an attorney breaches the duty of loyalty to the
client if the attorney acts with self or adverse interest.6" If the
attorney becomes emotionally and personally involved with his
client, this self interest can cause an attorney to lose his objectivity. In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith,6 the attorney engaged
in sexual relations with his client which impaired his professional judgment. Thus, sexual intimacy with a client can violate
both the Code and Rules when the lawyer's personal interest
and gratification clouds his primary responsibility to the client.
Ethical Consideration 5-5 states that "A lawyer should not
suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for his
benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client he is susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the
client." 6 2 This prohibition may be considered analogous to
influencing a client to provide sexual favors to an attorney.
This need to express appreciation can operate as a form of
transference similar to that which is found in psychotherapist
and patient relationships.6" To date, however, the legal profes58.
59.

MODEL CODE,

supra note 44, Canon 5.

Id. EC 5-1.

60. MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.8.
61. 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988). In this disciplinary proceeding the
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that professional misconduct in the form of
personal and emotional involvements with a client which had an adverse
effect on the advice or services during employment and attorney client
relationship to the client's disadvantage warrants public reprimand. The
attorney engaged in sexual relations with his client while representing her.
This impaired his professional judgment. He also revealed confidences
gained during the professional relationship to his client's detriment which
resulted in her removal as her minor child's guardian. The court found that
the lawyer's action may have been motivated by his discharge from the
representation of this client. His personal and emotional involvement
resulted in a serious failure of his judgment which brought the legal
profession into disrepute.
62. MODEL CODE, supra note 44, EC 5-5.
63. One commentator writes:
[T]ransference causes a desire to bestow affection. [Watson] warns
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sion has not considered sexual favors to be a gift as described
in EC 5-5 in spite of the fact that the client's agreement to have
sex with the attorney may stem from the same desire to express
appreciation as improper gift giving. Even where this does represent the client's motivation, allowing the attorney to participate in such sexual activity is no less inappropriate or harmful
than the manipulation of transference in psychotherapeutic
treatment. Nevertheless, application of EC 5-5 to the situation
of sexual involvement between a client and attorney is untested
at this time.
Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) makes it improper to accept
employment if the exercise of the attorney's professional
judgement on behalf of the client will be reasonably affected by
his own personal interests. A lawyer's desire to have a sexual
relationship with a client is surely a personal interest. 6' If a
lawyer should act on that sexual or romantic interest, it can
impair his judgment and adversely affect the best interests of
the client. In People v. Zeilinger,65 an attorney was publicly censured for engaging in sexual relations with his client while representing her in a divorce proceeding. The dissolution of the
marriage involved the custody of minor children and property
settlement matters. The court held the lawyer violated DR 1102(A)(1) and DR 5-101(A) in that he should not have agreed
to represent this client while involved in a sexual relationship.
Although the court noted that the client suffered no actual
harm from the sexual relationship, it acknowledged that the
potential for harm to the client is substantial and obvious. The
attorney, by engaging in a sexual relationship with a client
undergoing a divorce, may destroy the chances of the couple's
reconciliation, and blind the attorney to the proper exercise of
independent judgment. There is also a significant danger that
when the division of property or custody of minor children is
contested, the attorney who is sexually involved with his client
may himself become the focus of the dissolution or custody
proceeding, be called as a witness, and thereby inflict great
that this affectionate feeling [between attorney and client] is
unrealistic, wholly a product of the professional relationship; to act
on it "would be as unethical as making personal use of the client's
money or property which was entrusted to [the attorney] in the
course of carrying out the professional role."
Thomas Lyon, Note, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce Clients: The Lawyer's Prerogative?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 159, 186 (1987) (quoting Andrew Watson, The
Lawyer as Counselor, 5 FAM. L.J. 7 (1965)).
64. Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, 1
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 585, 594 (1988).

65.

814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991).
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harm on the client.6 6 The distinction between the reasoning of
this court, in the context of a disciplinary proceeding, and the
Illinois court hearing a malpractice suit, is stark. When the lawyer's sexual involvement has an adverse impact on his client's
legal position, a violation of DR 5-101 (conflict of interest) is
demonstrated.6 7 Rule 1.7(b) addresses the area of conflict of
interest stating, "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities . . . to [his] own interests."68 Rule
1.8(b) mandates that an attorney shall not use information
relating to representation of the client to the client's disadvantage without the client's consent.6"
How the Rules have been applied to a conflict of interest
involving the impairment of independent judgment is demonstrated in In re Ridgeway, 70 in which a public defender represented a woman charged with forgery on probation in an
alcoholic treatment program. A condition of the client's probation was abstinence from alcohol. The client left the treatment
program without permission. She then consulted with her
attorney for advice in avoiding the revocation of her probation.
While meeting with the client the attorney made sexual
advances toward her. The client avoided this encounter, but
stated that she.believed she owed her attorney a lot. On the
following day, the attorney arranged to meet her at a hotel in
which he provided his client with alcoholic beverages in violation of her probation. After consuming three beers she
acceded to his sexual advances. The attorney encouraged her
to violate the terms of her probation by drinking to serve his
own interest, and preyed on her vulnerability and her need of
his legal expertise to avoid the suspension of her probation. 7 ,
The legal harm the attorney caused his client is clear, and a
direct result of his failure to deal with the evident conflict of
interest. This case, and others, have held that the client must,
at the very minimum, be warned of the possible negative effect
of sexual involvement of the attorney and client, especially in
divorces involving custody and financial settlements, or when
an attorney may be called as a witness. 7 2 In the case of In re
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 810.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.7(b).
Id. Rule 1.8(b).
462 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1990).
Id. at 672-73.
See, e.g., In re Drucker, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990) (attorney had

76

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

Bourdon,7" the attorney assured his client that the upcoming
custody hearing would be successful instead of warning her of
the potential for problems resulting from their sexual involvement during her representation.
A most serious conflict of interest resulting from such sexual liaisons is the potential for the attorney to be called as an
adverse witness against his client. This may arise whenever the
client's behavior is an issue in the case, such as a case involving
custody of children. The regulations most directly on point in
this area are: Rule 3.7 and DR 5-102. The Rule warns that an
attorney shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness.74 The Code's counterpart prohibits a lawyer from serving as an advocate if the lawyer "learns
'75
or it is obvious that he/she will be called on as a witness."
VII.

APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF COMPETENT AND
DILIGENT REPRESENTATION TO DISCIPLINE CASES

The ethical codes specifically require the competent, diligent and (in the case of the Code only) zealous provision of
legal representation. Violations to this cluster of rules have
been found in attorney-client relationships which involved sexual contact. For example, a lawyer who is sexually involved
with his client may be in jeopardy of violating DR 7-101(A) (1),
sexual relations with an emotionally vulnerable client while representing her
in a divorce and custody proceeding).
73. 565 A.2d 1052, 1057 (N.H. 1989).
74. MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 3.7.
75. MODEL CODE, supra note 44, DR 5-102; see also Edwards v. Edwards,
567 N.Y.S.2d 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). This case involved a lawyer's failure
to withdraw from representing a wife in a divorce action until the husband
formally alleged that the lawyer was involved sexually with the wife. The
lawyer was not automatically disqualified from representing the client with
whom he was sexually involved. The NY Appellate Division stated that there
is no law or ethics rule mandating the lawyer's disqualification solely on the
basis of sexual involvement, but when the lawyer becomes involved in the
case as a witness in a divorce action as the alleged lover of the wife, then it is
proper for the attorney to withdraw.
The Court further stated in this case, that withdrawal was not necessary:
Even assuming the truth of the allegations there is not the slightest
hint that the lawyer, who knew the wife since 1981, took advantage
of her or the attorney-client relationship. She made no complaint.
There is also no finding that the lawyers's representation was
deficient, and nothing to support a finding that the wife or the
litigation was compromised. It was not until the litigation was
affected by the lawyer being called as an adverse witness was the
attorney required to withdraw and he did so with his client's
consent.
567 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
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which requires that a lawyer represent a client zealously and
not prejudice the rights of the client.7 6 In the disciplinary cases
already described, the attorneys risked prejudicing the rights of
their clients through their romantic involvement. Disciplinary
Rule 7-101(A)(3) specifically states that a lawyer shall not
intentionally prejudice or damage his client in the course of the
professional relationship. 7 7 In the Lehr, Bourdon and Drucker
cases referred to above, 78 the attorneys were found to have
seriously impaired their clients' legal position.
Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to act with diligence in representing a client. The comments following this Rule direct a
lawyer to represent a client despite opposition, obstruction, or
the personal inconvenience to the lawyer. 79 The Rules do not
provide more specific guidance, but the Rule clearly places the
client's needs above the lawyer's personal wishes, and at least
points to the potential disadvantage to a client's case where
there is sexual involvement between the attorney and the client. This Rule can only indirectly prevent harm to the client,
by requiring the attorney to withdraw from representation if
the attorney's personal interest in the relationship interferes
with the client's best interest. Here again, as in the cases discussed above, only if the sexual relationship actually interferes
with the lawyer's ability to provide diligent representation is
the attorney required to withdraw. The decision to withdraw is
left to the attorney, so that the interests of the client are left in
the hands of the attorney from whose attentions the Rule purports to protect the client. This example of discretionary self
policing once again leaves clients at risk.
The disciplinary tribunals have also referred to DR 6101 (A) (3) when disciplining attorneys for neglecting legal matters entrusted to them. When a lawyer is sexually involved with
a client, the lawyer may be inclined to delay the legal proceedings in order to extend the legal relationship to insure the continuation of the sexual relationship. This prolonging of the
legal controversy to the attorney's advantage violates DR 6101(A)(3), 80 EC 6-4,8 and Rules 1.182 and 1.383 involving
competence and diligence.
76. MODEL CODE, supra note 44, DR 7-101(A)(1).
77. Id. DR 7-101(A)(3).
78. See supra notes 57, 73 and 72.
79. MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.3.
80. MODEL CODE, supra note 44, DR 6-101(A)(3) ("A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.").
81. Id. EC 6-4 ("Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should
use proper care to safeguard the interest of his client . . . . In addition to
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VIII.

APPLICATION OF THE CATCH-ALL "APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY" PROVISIONS TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT
SEX CASES

The appearance of impropriety provision is set out in
Canon 9, and may be applied to attorney-client sexual relations. Ethical Consideration 9-6 asks an attorney to conduct
himself as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to
inspire the confidence, respect and trust of the client and the
public.8 4 The Canon continues by urging lawyers to strive to
avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.8 5 When the confidence or trust of a client
is compromised it becomes incumbent on the attorney to withdraw from representation as required by rule DR 21 10(B)(2). 8 6 If the lawyer knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule
he must withdraw. Rule 1.16, on terminating representation,
also stipulates that a lawyer shall not represent a client and
shall withdraw from representation if the representation will
87
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or law.
Rule 8.4(d) also provides that it is misconduct to engage in
conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 8
These general guidelines can be used as a basis for determining that sexual involvement with clients is a violation of the
rules, but they are far from specific, leaving the attorney with a
vague standard by which to measure behavior.
In summary, neither the Code, the Rules, nor the various
enactments in the states, presently address directly the issue of
being qualified to handle a particular matter, his obligation to his client
requires him to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention to his
legal work.").
82. MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.").
83. Id. Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.").
84. MODEL CODE, supra note 44, EC 9-6.

85. Id. Canon 9.
86. Id. DR 2-110 (B)(2). The rule provides:
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a
lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from
employment if: He knows or it is obvious that his continued
employment would result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
Id.
87.
88.

MODEL RULES, supra note 57, Rule 1.16.
Id. Rule 8.4(d).
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attorney-client sexual conduct in any specific way. To find
rules which even partially address the potential violations
requires careful analysis. The result of this absence of express
rules is that attorneys enjoy great discretion in deciding
whether their sexual involvement with a client violates an ethical rule - if they give the regulations any thought at all. The
Code and the Rules avoid the issue of emotional or psychological harm to clients by narrowly interpreting the attorney's fiduciary duty, limiting it to conduct within the legal
representation. Even where the Rules and Code have been
applied to discipline attorneys in these situations, proceedings
were generally limited to cases in which the sexual involvement
was actually shown to have impaired the client's legal representation and caused legal harm, or when the attorney's sexual
activity violated a criminal statute. The available Codes and
Rules have not been fully utilized as, nor understood to be,
prophylactic regulations to control the harmful aspects of
attorney client sexual relationships.
IX.

EVEN WHERE ATrORNEYS ARE SANCTIONED FOR IMPROPER
SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH CLIENTS, THE DISCIPLINARY

PROCESS HAS BEEN LENIENT IN THE
SANCTIONS IMPOSED

In the disciplinary' proceedings described above, attorneys
breached the applicable codes because of the harm they caused
to the client's legal position. In general, the states' disciplinary
tribunals and courts have arguably even then been lenient in
imposing sanction for these violations. In recent years, the
usual punishment in these cases is the public reprimand in a
published opinion.8 9 Suspensions from practice were sometimes imposed, varying from thirty days to two years, the latter
only in the most serious cases. 90 Disbarment was imposed only
for repeat offenses, or in cases involving criminal convictions. 9 ,
Public defenders and prosecutors were held to more stringent
standards in recognition of their. public trust.9 2
The courts have become more lenient over time. Disbarment in a 1933 case, In re Hicks,93 was unequivocal, yet in a
1982 case an attorney convicted of sexual misconduct with a
89.
90.
91.
N.Y.S.2d
92.

93.

See, e.g., In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981).
See In re Gibson, 369 N.W.2d 695 (Wis. 1985).
See In re Bourdon, 565 A.2d 1052 (N.H. 1989); In re Bowen, 542
45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
See In re Ridgeway, 462 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1990).

20 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1933).
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minor was suspended for a period only equal to his criminal
probation.9 4 In a recently reported New York Disciplinary Proceeding, In re Rudnick,9 5 the attorney was suspended from the
practice of law for two years as a result of coercing his client
into having sex with him and failing to act competently. He
withdrew from the case on the day of her divorce hearing after
she ended their relationship, generally prejudicing her legal
rights. In imposing the two year suspension, the court considered the fact that this attorney had previously been issued a
letter of reprimand in 1986 for a similar offense. This, his second appearance before the Disciplinary Committee, resulted in
the supposed severity of the suspension.9 6
The variability of sanctions imposed on attorneys demonstrates again the internal conflict of the profession over this
issue. There is a great reluctance on the part of the disciplinary
tribunals to punish in cases involving
sexual conduct. As the
97
court stated in In re Addonizio:
In setting the appropriate discipline, we are not interested in punishing the attorney, that is the province of
the criminal law. The primary purpose of the professional discipline is to protect the public against a member
of the bar who is unworthy of the trust or confidence
essential to the relationship of attorney and client.9 8
The Addonizio case further states, "[a]ny violation of law creates
some question about trust and confidence that the public may
reasonably expect to repose in the attorney. No matter what
the violation, some discipline may be needed to deter both the
attorney involved and other members of the bar."9 9 The court
was tentative in stating that, "some discipline may be neces94. In re Kimmel, 322 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1982). The attorney was
convicted of a felony involving sexual misconduct with minors. The court
was lenient because it attributed the attorney's misdeed to sexual dysfunction
which is treatable. Since the defendant in this case was undergoing treatment
and cooperating, the court concluded he was unlikely to be a danger to the
public and the profession. Although the opinion clearly did not condone the
attorney's behavior and considered the acts serious, the court only restricted
the lawyer's practice of law, allowing him to continue to "examine titles
during the period of suspension coextensive with the criminal probation."
The attorney retained the right to resume full practice at the conclusion of his
probation.
95. 581 N.Y.S.2d 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
96. Id. at 207.
97. 469 A.2d 492 (N.J. 1984).
98. Id. at 493 (quoting In re Introcaso, 140 A.2d 70, 74 (N.J. 1958)).
99. Id. at 493 (quoting In re Hughes, 446 A.2d 1208, 1213 (N.J. 1982)
(Schreiber, J., dissenting from order of disbarment)) (emphasis added).
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sary."' 0 0 In this case the attorney had pleaded guilty to a criminal sexual violation, yet he was only suspended from the
practice of law for three months. In sanctioning the attorney,
the court quoted extensively from Ethical Consideration 1-5
citing that the respect for the law must be more than a platitude
and claiming that the public confidence is paramount. Yet, in
applying EC 1-5, they suspended the attorney from practice of
law for three months, believing this to be ample punishment.'°'
The Wisconsin Court in In re Gibson,'0° also meted out a
ninety-day suspension to the attorney for unsolicited sexual
advances to a client. His behavior was corroborated by other
clients who presented similar complaints that the attorney had
made unwanted sexual offers during the period from 1975 to
1982. In disciplining this attorney, the court rejected the attorney's argument that his actions did not harm or damage the
client's legal interest or impact on his representation. The
attorney dismissed the client's nightmares as a result of his
advances and her general distraught condition, implying that
these could not reasonably be considered "damage" or "prejudice" as cited in the Code.' 0 3 The court in this case relied on a
prior case, State v. Heilprin, which involved an attorney charged
with similar but more aggravated conduct, and stated: "Conduct of the type engaged in by Heilprin cannot be condoned,
whatever the cause. The public must not be exposed to this
type of action from members of the legal profession."' °4
The Gibson court determined that "the public must not be
subjected to unsolicited sexual conduct by attorneys in the context of the attorney-client relationship."' 0 5 These are strong
words, but the limited three month suspension used to discipline the attorney tells another story, a story of ambivalence on
the part of the profession unable to come to grips with the
06
problem. 1
100.
101.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.

102.

369 N.W.2d 695 (Wis. 1985).

103. Id. at 699.
104. Id. (quoting State v. Heilprin, 207 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Wis. 1973)).
105. Id. at 699.
106. The mixed record of sanctions continues to the present. In a
number of recent cases, despite increasingly critical language of the tribunals
towards this conduct, the sanctions imposed generally continue to be limited
to censure or periods of suspension. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Samaha, 557 So.
2d 1349 (Fla. 1990) (minimum of one year suspension); In re Lewis, 415
S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1992) (three year suspension); Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d
1198 (N.H. 1990) (two year suspension); In re Kiley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (censure); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing, 559 N.E.2d
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AN OPPORTUNITY LOST

State ethical opinions issued in the last few years also give
mixed messages, and have generally avoided the opportunity to
provide clear-cut, generalized guidance. Closest to a general
prescription, Maryland issued Opinion 84-9 mandating that a
lawyer must withdraw from employment when he is sexually
involved with a client.10 7 The Opinion cites a situation in a
divorce proceeding in which a wife seeks legal advice on transferring property. This Opinion warns that sexual relations
between attorney and client reflect negatively on the integrity
of the legal profession and may have adverse
effects on a law0 8
yer's ability to protect his client's interest.1
In 1991, Oregon published Opinion 1991-99, which dealt
with the adverse effect on professional judgment of sexual relations with clients in a divorce case.' 0 9 The Opinion states, "[a]
lawyer may not have sexual relations with a client while the lawyer is representing the client in divorce proceedings as such
conduct may prejudice or damage the client unless the client is
capable of giving knowing consent to the continued representation."" 0 The Opinion implicitly acknowledges doubt that a
client can give informed voluntary consent. This concern is
addressed directly in Oregon's proposed new rule. I
An
example of the client's limited ability to give informed consent
was demonstrated in the case which was rendered concurrent
to the issuance of this Opinion, In re Howard,"' in which the
attorney provided legal services for a female criminal defendant. He was paid for his services with sexual favors. The client's situation made her dependent on the attorney. Her
ability to objectively consent to having sex with the attorney
was compromised by her immediate need for the legal representation and her inability to pay.
1359 (Ohio 1990) (public reprimand); In re Wolf, 826 P.2d 628 (Or. 1992)
(18 month suspension); In re Bellino, 417 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1992) (37 month
suspension); Discipline of Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856 (S.D. 1990) (one year
suspension).
107. Maryland State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Op. 84-9 (1984), quoted in
[Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:4334
(1985).
108. Id.
109. Oregon State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-99 (1991)
(emphasis added), quoted in [Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 1001:7114 (1992).
110. Id.

111.
112.

See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984).
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The inability of the client to resist sexual advances was also
discussed in an Iowa case, Committee on ProfessionalEthics v. Durham," 3 in which a female attorney was reprimanded for sexual
contact with a criminal defendant whom she visited in her professional capacity while he was in prison. The court in this case
admitted that there was little specific guidance on the subject of
sexual conduct,"14 but held the attorney to be accountable for
professional behavior. The court held, "[s]exual contact with a
client in a professional context is not activity which a reasonable member of the bar would suppose to be allowed by the
[Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers]. ' 5
In contrast to the somewhat generalized prohibitions indicated in the Maryland and Oregon Opinions on sexual conduct, California only prohibits sexual relations between
attorneys and clients in situations when the legal representation is actually and demonstrably impaired. In California's Ethical Opinion 1987-92 the Bar stated:
A lawyer may engage in sexual relationship with client so
long as the lawyer's independent professional judgment
remains uncompromised, client confidence is maintained
and the client is able to consent to the sexual relationship, the client is able to maintain independent judgment
in the professional relationship and the lawyer is careful
to preserve the client's secrets and avoid the possibility of
113.

279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).

114. Id. at 283.
115. Id. at 284. This case scrutinized the disciplinary rules very
carefully in an attempt to overturn the lawyer's long term suspension. The
court distinguished the fact that there is nothing inherently wrong in sexual
contact between a lawyer and client as long as it does not involve the legal
representation. This attorney was reprimanded not for the act, but for the
impropriety of involving her client in sexual conduct during a visit at the
penitentiary when the attorney was there to render legal service. This
attorney was censured for "impropriety" and embarrassment to the legal
profession, rather than for taking advantage of her client in a vulnerable
situation. If this same activity had taken place in a more private setting rather
than a prison consultation room, the court may not have censured the
attorney. Because the attorney had signed the prison log as attorney, the
sexual contact which took place on the visit could not be considered of a
private nature between consenting adults. Id.
A positive aspect of this decision is that the court stated that an attorney
familiar with Iowa's Code should be on notice that sexual contact with a client
amounts to professional impropriety if the involvement occurs while in the
role of attorney, but the court would not hold that sexual involvement with a
client was a violation per se. Id. at 284.
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in either the personal or professional
undue influence
6
relationship. 1
Alaska Opinion 88-1 parallels California's position by
prohibiting sexual relations with clients only if:
1) the lawyer initiates the relationship and the client's
ability to consent is impaired;
2) the lawyer performs legal services in exchange for sexual favors;
3) the lawyer's involvement inhibits the lawyer's ability
to protect client's interests or otherwise damages the
client's case;
4) the sexual relationship may adversely affect the client's emotional stability;
5) the sexual conduct is illegal.'' 7
The Opinion clearly permits an ongoing sexual relationship which pre-dates the legal relationship. Exception Number
4 breaks new ground in acknowledging the emotional impact of
attorney-client relationships, but this opinion has yet to be
applied in an Alaskan case.
Other than those cited here, the authors are unaware of
opinions from ethics committees in any other state directly
dealing with the permissibility or otherwise of attorney-client
sexual relations.
XI.

THE PROFESSION IS SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE EMOTIONAL
HARM TO CLIENTS

The vagueness of the codes and the discretion available in
applying them in this area demonstrates that the profession has
largely ignored or at least down-played an important aspect of
the issue - the harm caused to clients. The emotional suffering experienced by the client who is sexually involved with the
attorney deserves special concern. This is especially true in
divorce cases. Audrey Rubin, Chairperson of the Illinois Task
Force on Gender Bias in the Courts 1990, noted in her committee report that the vulnerable clients are usually women who
lack financial resources and may fear they will lose their house,
their children and their source of income if they do not get
good legal help. They seek legal help in a highly emotional
116. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof. Responsibility &
Conduct, 114 Formal Op. 1987-92 (1987), quoted in [Ethics Opinions] Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:1603 (1991).
117. Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 88-1 (1988), quoted in
[Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:1303

(1991).
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state. Thus, their relationship with their attorney is delicate,
and should not be compromised and contaminated by sexual
relations." 8 In fact, the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers in Chicago drafted a guide called "Bounds of Advocacy", which advises that attorneys must never have intimate
sexual relations with clients. The group cites the pressure clients feel when an attorney makes sexual advances believing
they (the clients) must submit to these demands to get good
representation." 19
Northwestern University Law Professor John Elson, who
represented the plaintiff in the Suppressed 120 case, noted that
'"[i]t's a very tense time, in which they [clients] are dependent
totally on this attorney often for child custody, for their financial future." 121 According to Elson, the attorney may seem like
the last refuge in a world that is falling apart. "The woman will
throw her feelings of attachment onto an attorney, trying ' to
22
find in the attorney someone to develop her self-esteem."'
Professor Elson believes the relationship which develops in this
situation is artificial, built on fears and anxiety, not real feelings
of intimacy. Elson, and other attorneys, liken this bonding to
the transference which occurs between patients and therapists.
Criminal defendants and grieving widows may also experience this vulnerability when seeking legal representation.
Thus, the caution against attorneys having sex with their clients
does not only apply in divorce cases, but in any situation in
which the client may be in a vulnerable or emotionally needy
state, making them susceptible to personal as well as legal harm
from their romantic involvement with their attorney.
XII.

ILLINOIS, CALIFORNIA, AND OREGON PROPOSE ETHICAL
RULES ON SEXUAL CONDUCT BETWEEN ATTORNEYS
AND CLIENTS

The Illinois legislature passed a resolution prohibiting sexual relations between the attorney and client which urges:
[T]he Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule of professional conduct prohibiting attorney-client sexual relationships during the period of the attorney-client
relationship, unless the client is the spouse of the attor118. See Mary Wisniewski, Sex with Clients an UnfairAffair, Cm.
Apr. 20, 1991, at 1.
119. Id. at 12.
120. See supra text accompanying note 33.
121. Wisniewski, supra note 118, at 12.
122. Id.

BULL.,

DAILY L.
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ney, the sexual relationship pre-dates the commencement of the attorney-client relationship, or some other
situation exists in which the court deems the prohibition
would not detract
from the attorney's representation of
3
the client. 12

The resolution asserts,
Emotional detachment is essential to the lawyer's ability
to render competent legal services, yet it is extremely difficult to separate sound judgment from the emotion or
bias that may result from a sexual relationship between a
lawyer and his or her client during
the period that an
1 24
attorney-client relationship exists.
The goal of the resolution, according to its sponsor, Illinois
Senator Adeline J. Geo-Karis, is to prevent sexual coercion of
clients by attorneys. She advocates the inclusion of a specific
rule to eliminate any ambiguity in the standards for proper professional conduct. 125 She is supported in her efforts by the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts. Their report
published in July of 1990, stated that it is difficult to document
the incidence of attorney-client sexual relationships. The
report pronounced:
Most clients are not likely to file grievances or lawsuits,
and only 1% of the 5,000 complaints which the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC)
received last year involved this conduct. Nonetheless,
the ARDC determined that the problem is a "systemic,
unchanging and consistent trend" in the domestic relations field. Although all sexual harassment charges are
automatically referred to the Inquiry Board, the ARDC
has never been able to prove a case, because the evidence
presented always pits the female client's word against the
male attorney's which has invariably been regarded as
inadequate under the burden of proof applied by the
panels.
Because of the vulnerability of a typical divorce client and the resultant potential for abuse by the domestic
relations attorney, it is fundamentally unethical for an
attorney to engage in sexual relationship with his or her
123.

S. Res. 361, 87th Gen. Assembly (1991) Ill. Laws.

124. Id.
125. Press Release of Illinois State Senator Adeline J. Geo-Karis (RZion), July 2, 1991.
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client which the attorney is representing
that client in a
26
marriage dissolution proceeding.'
The Illinois rule has yet to be written, and it is unknown
whether the rule will prohibit sexual relations only if it interferes with legal representation, or will it prohibit sexual conduct with client as a per se breach of the fiduciary duty of the
attorney to the client. Local Illinois bar associations are skeptical of the rule and are resisting the presumption that attorneyclient sexual relations are inherently unethical and unprofessional. Advocates for the proposed rule fear that placing the
responsibility for the new rule's adoption with the court is
futile. Karen Winfield, president of Illinois Legal Reform Association, stated, "What this does
is kick the ball back to the court
12 7
which already rejected it.'
California adopted a rule of professional conduct in September 1992. Rule 3-120, Sexual Relations with Client states:
(A) for purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means
sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate
part of another person for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(B) A member shall not:
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client
incident to or as a condition of any professional
representation; or
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in entering into sexual relations with a client; or
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom
the member has sexual relations if such sexual
relations cause the member to perform legal
services incompetently in violation of rule 3110.128
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations
between members and their spouses or to ongoing
consensual relationships which predate the initiation
of the lawyer-client relationship.
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a
client but does not participate in the representation
of that client, the lawyers in the firm shall not be sub126. ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON
REPORT (1990).

GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS,

1990

127. Reaction Mixed to Lawyer/Client Sex Harassment Ban, NEWS-SUN
(Waukegan, Ill.), July 5, 1991, at 3a.
128. Rule 3-110 requires that attorneys represent clients competently.
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ject to discipline under this rule solely because of the
29
occurrence of such sexual relations.'
In the discussion of this rule, the Bar Association of California noted that a client exhibits great emotional vulnerability
and dependence upon the advice and guidance of counsel.
Attorneys owe the utmost duty of good faith and fidelity to
their clients, in the context of a fiduciary relationship of the
very highest character. As a result, California has already provided that all dealings between an attorney and client that are
beneficial to the attorney will be closely scrutinized with utmost
strictness for unfairness.13 0 Where attorneys exercise undue
influence over clients or take unfair advantage of clients, discipline is appropriate.' 3 ' The goal of the rule is to ensure that
the client's interests are kept paramount in the course of the
member's representation.
This proposed rule was circulated for public comment on
the question of the rule's creating a presumption that if the
attorney engages in sexual conduct with a client, a rule violation has occurred. The lawyer has the burden to prove otherwise. The comments on the presumption issue were submitted
to the California Supreme Court on January 9, 1992. The collection contained twelve favorable responses, eight opposed,
and four neutral. The favorable comments generally expressed
concern that the attorney's professional judgment is affected
when engaged in a sexual relationship with a client. Several
respondents saw the rule as a means of protecting consumers
from attorney misconduct, unwanted coercion and duress. The
129. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 3120. In the form in which this Rule was originally proposed by the State Bar
of California, there was an additional sub-paragraph (E):
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or her client
will be presumed to violate rule 3-120 paragraph (B)(3). The
presumption shall only be used as a presumption affecting the
burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings involving alleged
violations of these rules.
"Presumption affecting the burden of proof" means that
presumption defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and

606.
Id., quoted in Sexual Relations with Client: Problem with No ClearAnswer, [8 Current
Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 171, 172 Uune 17, 1992).
The authors believe that by creating the presumption and shifting the
burden of proof to the attorney, this clause would inevitably have fostered
and encouraged the very battles of testimony which it is intended to avoid.
As is well understood from rape cases (not to mention the Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings), this can itself be a process harmful to the victim.

130.

See Giovanazzi v. State Bar, 619 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Cal. 1980).

131.

See Magee v. State Bar, 374 P.2d 807, 812 (Cal. 1962).
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supporters of the rule believed that the need to protect the client overrode the attorney's right to have sex with whom he or
she chooses. Others stated that attorneys need to be held to
the same standard set for the medical profession which strictly
13 2
forbids sexual relations with patients.
The critical comments which opposed the rule did so on
the grounds that the State Bar does not have the right to pry
into an attorney's bedroom, and that consenting adults have
the right to decide about their sexual activities. The opposition
to the rule also stated that any attempt to regulate an attorney's
inter-personal relations is impossible, expensive and unnecessary, claiming that the harmful effects of intimate relations
between attorney and client are already proscribed by other
disciplinary provisions. The critical comments expressed concern that the rule may violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments resulting in an increase in difficult and protracted
litigation and enforcement. The final concern of the opponents of this rule was their fear that the over regulation of the
legal profession would lead to an increase in malpractice
actions. 133
Former California Assembly Member Lucille RoybalAllard,1 3 4 one of the leading proponents of a formal rule, is
apparently unsatisfied with the rule as adopted. She has organized passage of a bill through the California legislature, which
was signed into law in September, 1992, which varies from 1the
3 5
Supreme Court's Rule 3-120 in three material particulars.
First, in place of paragraph (B)(1) of Rule 3-120, the code
adopts the following language:
(1) Expressly or impliedly condition the performance of
legal services for a current or prospective client upon
the client's willingness
to engage in sexual relations
136
with the attorney.

Second, it adds the italicized language at the end of paragraph
(B)(3), as follows:
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom the
attorney has sexual relations if the sexual relations
cause the attorney to perform legal services incompe132. Memorandum from the Subcommittee on Sex with Clients to the
Members of the Board of Governors, State Bar of California, Report and
Recommendation Re: Proposed New Rule 3-120 (Apr. 10, 1991) [hereinafter
Report on Sex with Clients].
133. Id.
134. Ms. Roybal-Allard is currently serving in the U.S. Congress.

135. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
136. Id.

CODE

§ 6106.9 (West 1992).
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tently in violation of Rule 3-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, or if
the sexual relations would,3 or
would be likely to, damage or
7
prejudice the client's case.'
Third, it adds the following paragraph (e):
(e) Any complaint made to the State Bar alleging a violation of subdivision (a) shall be verified under oath by
3 8
the person making the complaint.'
Oregon's State Bar recently adopted an express rule concerning attorney-client sex, which is subject to Oregon
Supreme Court approval. The proposed Oregon rule is as
follows:
DR 5-110 SEXUAL RELATIONS wrrH CLIENTS
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client of the lawyer unless a consensual sexual
relationship existed between them before the lawyerclient relationship commenced.
(B) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a representative of a current client of the lawyer if the sexual
relations would, or would likely, damage or prejudice
the client in the representation.
(C) For purposes of DR 5-110 "sexual relations" means
(1) Sexual intercourse; or
(2) Any touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person or causing such person to touch
the sexual or other intimate parts of the lawyer
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
(D) For purposes of DR 5-110 "lawyer" means any lawyer who assists in the representation of the client,
but does not include other
firm members who pro39
vide no such assistance.'
DR 5-105

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: FORMER AND
CURRENT CLIENTS

(C) Vicarious Disqualification of Affiliates. Except as
permitted in subsections (D) and (F), when a lawyer
is required in decline employment or to withdraw
from employment under a disciplinary rule other
137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139.

OREGON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY Proposed

5-110.

Rule
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than DR 2-1 10(B)(3) or DR 5-102(A) or DR 5-110 no
other member of the lawyer's firm may accept or
continue such employment.1 40
XIII.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROPOSED RULES

None of the rules, as adopted, or as proposed, go far
enough to solve the dilemma of when sexual relations between
attorney and client are unethical. The California Rule prohibits lawyers from demanding or coercing sex from clients, but
the measure of unethical behavior is still rooted in performance
of legal representation. Therefore, a violation of the rule will
only exist if the sexual involvement impairs the attorney's ability to render competent legal services. The issue of harm to a
client beyond the legal representation is still not addressed even in Former Assembly Member Roybal-Allard's bill.
Former California State Senator Lucille Roybal-Allard
originally proposed an outright ban on all sexual relations
between attorneys and clients except when the attorney and client are married or their personal relationship predates their
professional one.14 1 She began her efforts in 1989 to have the
California State Bar restrict sex with clients through a new disciplinary rule. Her intent was to discipline attorneys who prey
on clients' "vulnerability during period of emotional stress"
particularly in divorce and probate cases.' 4 2 The outright ban
was defeated; the Board of Governors of the California Bar
Association modified the absolute ban on attorney client sexual
relations, finding it too restrictive. They contended that an
absolute prohibition may violate constitutional rights
to associ43
ation, privacy and the right to choose counsel.'
140. Id. Proposed Rule 5-105.
141. Memorandum from Michael Simon, Staff Attorney, Office of
Professional Competence, Planning and Development, State Bar of
California, to Judith Grimaldi (Sept. 13, 1991); see also Report on Sex with
Clients, supra note 132.
142. DanJ. DeBenedictis, CaliforniaRestricts Attorney-Client Sex, A.B.A.J.,
July 1991, at 26.
143. Id. This view is supported in Yael Levy, Attorneys, Clients and Sex:
Conflicting Interests in the California Rule, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649 (1992).

The author, while not suggesting that there should be no rule, argues for an
even more restricted and narrowly drafted rule than that adopted.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

RELATING TO A PROPOSED RULE PROHIBITING

ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEX

A.

The Right of Privacy Cases

The contention that an absolute prohibition may violate

the right of privacy is in direct opposition to the court's holding
in BarbaraA. v. John G. 144 which stated that the right to sexual
privacy is not an absolute right.1 4 The Supreme Court has
held that the right to sexual privacy exists within the family
right of privacy' 4 6 or within an individual's right to bear and
beget a child.' 4 7 This type of privacy may only be infringed
upon to uphold a compelling state interest. Regulation in this
area must be drawn narrowly to provide the least restrictive
alternative necessary to facilitate a compelling state interest. It
is unclear that this right to privacy extends to extramarital sexual relationships. In Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in

Griswold, he stated that the constitutionality of Connecticut's
laws against adultery and fornication was "beyond doubt," and
that Griswold's holding in "no way interferes with the State's
proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."' 4 8 In
Eisenstadtv. Baird,'4 9 Justice Brennan conceded that the legislature enjoys a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to
prevent fornication.' 5 ° In Bowers v. Hardwick, 5 ' the Court
would not grant sexual autonomy to homosexual relationships
under the right to privacy. It is clear from the Griswold-Eisenstadt line of cases that Justices have consciously been unwilling
144. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983).
145. Id. at 431. The court stated in this case,
Although the right to privacy is a freedom to be carefully guarded, it
is evident that it does not insulate a person from all judicial inquiry
into his or her sexual relations. We do not think it should insulate
from liability one sexual partner who by intentionally tortious
conduct causes physical injury to another.
Id. Public policy does not demand such protection for the right of privacy.
The court cited several instances where the right of privacy has been invaded
because of compelling state interests. It is clear from this case and from other
California case precedents that the right to privacy is not absolute and government intervention in matters affecting an individual right to privacy in sexual matters has been sanctioned in both criminal (marital rape cases) and civil
law (paternity suits).
146. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148. 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
149. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

150.
151.

Id. at 449.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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to extend a right of sexual privacy to unmarried persons. The
individual's right to decide to prevent conception and the right
to choose whether to bear a child has been upheld in Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Roe, but contraception and abortion are issues
factually and legally distinct from a right to engage in sexual
relations. The Court has limited the right to privacy to marriage and childbearing, not to a generalized right of sexual
autonomy. Finally, even if the right to sexual privacy is attributed to the Constitution, the Eisenstadt opinion of Justice Brennan relied on a rational basis test, making no attempt to
identify a fundamental right or imply any need for heightened
52
scrutiny. 1
The California courts have recognized that the state has a
fundamental right to enact laws which promote public health,
welfare and safety, even though such laws may invade the
offender's right to privacy. 153 Thus, the California State Bar in
proposing its rule regulating attorney-client sexual contact
itself cites the following compelling state interests to justify the
rule:
1) the State's interest in regulating the practice of professions operating within its jurisdiction;
2) the State's interest in protecting the public welfare in
relation to services provided by State regulated
professions;
3) the State's interest in promoting competent legal representation through avoidance of emotional bias and
loss of professional judgment resulting from attorneys' sexual contact with clients;
4) the State's interest in promoting competent legal representation through avoidance of conflicts of interest
(on the part of the attorneys) resulting from attorneys'
15 4
sexual contact with clients.
B.

The Right of Association Cases and the Overbreadth Doctrine

In order not to run afoul of the constitutional right to privacy and association, the California State Bar has attempted to
tailor its proposed regulation to provide what they view as the
least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve the compelling
152. 405 U.S. 438 (1972), quoted in Bruce Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus
of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 541 (1983).
153. See Barbara A. v.John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
154. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA APPROVE PROPOSED RULE 3-120, ENCLOSURE 12 AT 7-8. (May,
1991).
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state interests set forth. The California State Bar concluded
that a flat prohibition in this area was not the least restrictive
alternative and was too absolute to meet a constitutional challenge. In reaching this conclusion, the California State Bar
examined how its proposed rule affected the right to freedom
of association.' 5 5 In Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,' 56 the United
States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to
"freedom of intimate association" and "freedom of expressive
association." The Court held that choice to enter into an intimate human relationship cannot be intruded on by the state.
Freedom of association is viewed as a fundamental personal liberty and is afforded constitutional protection. 5 7 Palko v. Connecticut, 5 1 supports Roberts in holding that the freedom to
express basic human emotions and feelings is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. In the face of these constitutional
provisions and protections, a rule regulating an attorney's sexual relations with the client must balance compelling and
important state interests and an individual's right to privacy
and freedom of association. The match between the state need
and the outcome of the rule must be very close, eliminating the
possibility of being over inclusive and over regulatory. For
these reasons, the California State Bar declined to proceed with
the originally proposed flat prohibition rule, in order to permit
supposedly consensual sexual relationships between attorneys
and clients, as long as the relationship was not induced by coercion, intimidation, or undue influence and would not interfere
with competent legal representation. This reasoning is flawed
and incomplete.
The First Amendment does not guarantee the right to
employ every conceivable method of expression at all times
and in all places; a restriction on expressive activity may be
invalid only if the remaining modes of expression are inadequate. 59 Even an absolute rule prohibiting sexual relations
between attorney and client during the professional relationship is not so restrictive that the attorney is unable to express
himself sexually; he or she is only restricted from sexual intimacy with a client during legal representation. If the attorney
155.

Interview with David Bell, Senior Staff Attorney, and Michael

Simon, Staff Attorney, Office of Professional Competence Planning and
Development, State Bar of California (Mar. 15, 1992).
156. 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
157. Id. at 618.
158. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
159. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 812 (1984).
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wishes to engage in sexual acts with a client, a choice is
presented: either to continue to act as attorney, and to forego
a sexual relationship, or to withdraw as counsel and thereby
become free to engage in the sexual relationship.
In two cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 16 0 and City Councilof Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 1 6 1 the Supreme Court has held
that States have leeway and authority to curtail First Amendment freedoms for plainly legitimate reasons, and that any
alleged overbreadth must be real and substantial, and judged
in the context of a state's legitimate purpose. Any absolute
prohibition of sexual relations between attorney and client during the course of representation would be constitutional under
this standard. A law which said that attorneys must be celibate
while they practice law would be overbroad - because the prescription would go beyond the purpose of the rule, namely
preventing attorneys from having sex with clients. But a rule
which says, in effect, that lawyers may not have sex with clients
because it is expressly related and limited to the legitimate
state purpose, and because even an absolute prohibition leaves
the attorney with a choice - between continuation or termination of the professional relationship, and foregoing or commencing a sexual relationship - would not be overbroad.
Such a rule is directly and expressly limited to the prevention
of the harm against which it is directed.
In contrast to the California State Bar's (and, now the California Supreme Court's) narrow interpretation of what violates
their fiduciary duty to their client, the medical professions'
strict ethical rule prohibiting sex with patients has never been
successfully challenged on these constitutional grounds.
Indeed California law itself now bans sex between physicians
and psychotherapists and their patients.' 6 2 This rule has never
been found to violate either the right to privacy or the right of
free association. For all of these reasons, the constitutional
arguments apparently adopted by the California State Bar to
avoid an absolute prohibitory rule are unpersuasive.
We do believe, however, that the California State Bar
probably represents well the whole of the legal profession in its
reluctance to accept an absolute prohibition, precisely because
it resents the imposition of restrictions on the privilege of sexual freedom in adult consensual relations. This is probably a
fair statement of the views of many attorneys, even though
160.
161.

162.

413 U.S. 601 (1973).
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990).
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most attorneys would probably also agree with Justice Murray
who stated in Suppressed v. Suppressed,163 that "the activity
involved [sexual relations with clients] has been considered
wrong since biblical times."" Consistent with this historic
view, when a emotionally vulnerable client looks to the attorney
for guidance during a crisis, the fiduciary duty ought to take
precedence over the "right" to sexual freedom. The lawyer
who engages in sexual relations with his client compromises
the client's best interest. There can be no truly consensual
relationship between an attorney and client, because the
dynamics of power and subservience favor the attorney. The
client suffers from the same, inherent psychological vulnerabilities found in medical, therapeutic or pastoral relationships.
These inequities inherent in the relationship leave the client
vulnerable to an attorney's advances.
The attorney's fiduciary duty should override the attorney's right to freedom of association. The California State
Bar's proposed rule protects the client from legal harm and
from illegal activities such as sex in lieu of legal fees, but leaves
the client open to other possible harm. The proposed rule fails
to recognize the compromise of the client's best interest for the
attorney's own interest. Instead of the simplicity and easy
enforceability of an absolute rule, the proposed California
State Bar rule would create a morass of contradictory testimony
between attorney and client in every contested case. Surely the
spectacle of the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings has
sufficiently demonstrated how much of a "no-win" situation
this would be. In many cases, such a battle could serve only to
compound in public humiliation the harm already caused to the
client.
The legal profession has a history of regulating and
restricting its members so as to avoid possible conflicts of interest, and to maintain its ethical standards. A rule prohibiting
attorney-client sexual relations is within the state's right to regulate the profession as part of the licensing of attorneys. Since
the interest of the state is to insure both competent legal representation and to prevent harm to clients, a properly crafted
rule must recognize the attorney's fiduciary responsibility. As a
result, the state must expressly protect the vulnerable client,
and seek to prevent emotional or personal harm which result
from breaches of that responsibility. Thus, the legal profession
must develop a rule similar to that controlling their medical
163.

565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill.
App. 1990).

164.

Id. at 104.
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brethren, strictly prohibiting sex with clients. No less restrictive rule will adequately protect clients from harm or prevent
these breaches of the fiduciary relationship.
The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding that
the practice of law is a right for one who is qualified by his
learning and moral character.' 6 5 Justices Blackmun, Harlan,
and White, dissenting in Baird v. Arizona,' 6 6 describe the state's
right to regulate the Bar to protect a client's confidences, aspirations, freedom and property and to demand of the lawyer
more than the completion of formal legal education and passing the bar. The state can demand character of its attorneys,
and it is this character that the state holds out to the public
when it authorizes an applicant to practice law. The opinion
also quotes Justice Frankfurter who stated:
The Bar has not enjoyed prerogatives; it has been
entrusted with anxious responsibilities ... from a profes-

sion charged with such responsibilities there must be
exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense
of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance
of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, have6 7been compendiously described as "moral
1
character."
The plurality in Baird also acknowledges that Arizona has a
legitimate interest in determining whether the applicant has the
"qualities of character," but this right may be counterbalanced
by the attorney's individual First Amendment rights. 6' 8
Drawing the line between permissible and impermissible
sexual relationships between attorney and client is a difficult
one. An absolute ban on sex between attorney and clients, if
observed, affords clients complete protection from negative
consequences of the sexual relations. The ban may preclude
relationships that do not involve problems of overreaching, but
this prohibition is temporary, lasting only the duration of the
legal relationship. The restriction will only interfere with sexual autonomy, if the sexual relationship and the legal relationship exist contemporaneously.
Lawrence Dubin in his article on attorney-client sex in
matrimonial cases in the GeorgetownJournal of Legal Ethics proposed the following rule be added to the Model Code as DR 5165.
166.
167.

See, e.g., Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 384 (1866).
401 U.S. 1, 20 (1971).
Id. (quoting Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,

247 (1957) (concurring opinion)).
168. 401 U.S. at 6.
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108 and to the Model Rules as Rule 1.8 (k): "A lawyer shall not
engage in any sexual relations with a divorce client during the
lawyer-client relationship."' 6 9
A rule such as this would eliminate the distinction some
courts have drawn between professional and personal conduct
and would acknowledge that the professional relationship is
inextricably bound up with the personal feelings of the individuals involved. This rule would recognize that it is artificial to
separate the emotions of personal life from the representation
of the client.' 7 ° In almost all cases, the sexual relationship
between the attorney and client would be unlikely but for the
professional relationship which brought the partners together.
However, even this rule is inadequate, being too narrowly
focused on one kind of representation.
The regulations governing professional responsibility
need to label all sexual relations with clients during the course
and continuation of the professional relationship as misconduct. This behavior, in addition to its adverse effects upon the
client, damages the integrity of the legal profession. Each time
an attorney misuses his influence over a client to gain sexual
advantage, the attorney not only harms the client, but also
reflects adversely upon his fitness to practice law.' 7 ' As we
have demonstrated, these violations can sometimes be forced
to fit the mould of the existing rules, but an explicit rule will
take the guess-work out of the issue. As Dubin explains in the
conclusion of his article, because there is no per se rule prohibiting sexual relations with clients, lawyers defend against disciplinary proceedings citing the general provisions of the codes
in their favor. 7 '
The rule should also not be limited to certain practice
areas, such as divorce, but should apply to all types of legal
representation. The rule should require that lawyers withdraw
from legal representation when there is sexual involvement
with the client. The risk of compromising a client's interest,
overreaching or manipulating a client for the attorney's self
gratification must be avoided.
Therefore a specific, clear and universal rule is needed
which bans sexual relations between an attorney and client
unless the client is the attorney's spouse or the relationship
predates the initiation of the attorney-client legal relationship.
169.
170.

Dubin, supra note 64, at 618.
Lyon, supra note 63, at 180.

171.
172.

See supra pp. 62-64.
Dubin, supra note 64, at 618.
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Even then, it is the pre-existence of the sexual relationship, and
not the lack of potential harm from mixing- the professional
with the sexual relationship which gives presumptive legitimacy
to the simultaneous continuation of the two relationships.
However, the potential for harm remains. Accordingly, even
the Oregon rule 173 does not go far enough, in that it fails to
require attorneys to forgo the professional relationship where
that relationship, or the client may be harmed, not withstanding that the sexual relationship preceded the professional
involvement.
The rule proposed by the authors is as follows:
1. A lawyer shall not, for so long as the attorney-client
relationship continues to exist, have sexual contact
with a client unless the client is the spouse of the
attorney or the sexual relationship predates the initiation of the attorney-client relationship. Even in
these provisionally- exempt relationships, the attorney should strictly scrutinize his/her behavior for any
conflicts of interest between the attorney's personal
interests and the interests of the client, and to determine if any harm may result to the client or to the
representation. If there is any reasonable possibility
that the legal representation of the client may or will
be impaired, or the client harmed by the continuation of the sexual relationship during the course of
representation, the attorney should immediately
withdraw from the legal representation.
2. A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a representative of a current client of the lawyer if the sexual
relations would, or would likely, damage or prejudice
the client in the representation.
3. For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means:
(1) Sexual intercourse; or
(2) Any touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person or causing such person to touch
the sexual or other intimate parts of the lawyer
for the purpose; of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
The authors would also follow DR 5-105(C) of the Oregon rule
in imposing vicarious disqualification of a lawyer's firm where a
lawyer is required to decline or to withdraw from employment
by operation of the prohibition. The Oregon rule does permit
representation to continue, however, where the sexual relation173.

See supra pp. 90-91.
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ship is between a lawyer who provides no assistance in the representation of the client (DR 5-110(D)). This appears to be
fraught with its own perils, relating to questions of disclosure,
and "Chinese wall" issues familiar in other conflict of interest
situations, but on balance is probably appropriate, and better
expressed than unstated and left to be imputed in subsequent
interpretations of the rule.
The rule as proposed will withstand constitutional challenge because of the compelling state interest in preventing
abuse of the fiduciary obligations at the heart of the attorneyclient relationship, and the imbalance of the power relationship
between the attorney and client. No convincing argument has
been advanced by the bar stating why the legal profession
should not treat itself in any way differently from the medical,
psychotherapy or social work professions. Lawyers are (or
should be) entitled to no greater constitutional protections
than these other professions. Nothing in the proposed rule
prevents any sexual relationship; what it prohibits is the sexual
and professional relationship from co-existing. Freedom of
choice, freedom of association and privacy rights are maintained unimpaired. The attorney (and the client) are merely
required to choose which relationship is paramount. When the
issue is presented in this way, the opportunity within the professional relationship for overreaching and coercion is eliminated. The attorney who violates the authors' proposed rule is
subject to discipline; and if the attorney is interested in behaving ethically, he must give his client a real choice as to what
kind of a relationship the client wishes - personal or professional. This choice cannot be presented as unfair, or burdensome on 74the bar; we challenge our readers to argue
otherwise. 1

174. Support for a per se rule based on the Oregon model is to be found
in two recent articles, Caroline Forell, Lawyers, Clients and Sex: Breaking the
Silence on the Ethical and Liability Issues, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 611 (1992);
and John M. O'Connell, Note, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney-Client Relationship:
A Proposed Rule, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 887 (1992). The rules proposed in these
articles do not, however, deal with the problems which exist where sexual
relations precede the commencement of the attorney-client relationship. It is
notable that at least one court has recognized that the pre-existence of a

relationship does not preclude discipline in an appropriate case. In re Lewis,
415 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1992).

